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CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INDICTMENT AND UNANIMOUS VER-
DICT IN HAWAII.
The imperative necessity of a final settlement of the ques-
tion whether the Constitution extends to ourisland possessions
is shown by the latest decisions from Hawaii, their Supreme
Court giving two conflicting opinions on the same day, owing
to the change of a single judge. Rx-parte Edwards and Terri-
tory of Hawaii v. Marshall. And the United States district
judge has refused to release on habeas corpus the prisoners in
the latter case.
On July 7, 1898, by a joint resolution of Congress, the Re-
public of Hawaii was annexed to the United States. In terms
it was, "Resolved, that * * * the said Hawaiian islands be and
hereby are annexed as a part of the United States. * ** * The
municipal legislation of the Hawaiian islands not inconsistent
with this resolution, nor contrary to the Constitution of the
United States, shall remain in force until the Congress of the
United States shall otherwise determine." 30 U. S. Stat. at
Large, p. 750. The ceremony of transfer took place August
12, 1898. Not untilJune 14, 1900, however, was Hawaii or-
ganized into a territory.
Intermediate the act of transfer and the taking effect of the
enabling act, one Edwards was tried for an attempt to
commit sodomy, upon an indictment found by a judge,
and convicted by a verdict of ten out of twelve jurors,
and sentenced to five years' imprisonment-all of which
were regular under the old Hawaiian law, but which
were questioned upon habeas corpus as being in viola-
tion of the United States Constitution, requiring prosecutions
for infamous crimes to be upon an indictment by a grand jury
first, and then conviction by an unanimous verdict. The major-
ity opinion by Galbraith, J., is very full, and concludes that the
Constitution did apply and grants the prisoner's discharge. It
follows the line of argument advanced by Tochren, J., in Ex-
parte Ortez, 100 Fed. 961, holding that the Constitution and
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the legislative power are co-extensive; that with the Constitu-
tion go its guarantees, especially its provisions requiring an in-
dictment and unanimous verdict; and that, therefore, the neg-
ative provisions of the Constitution designed to protect life
and property were in force after the transfer and before the
organic act went into effect. In a vigorous dissenting opinion,
Frear, C. J., maintains with ability that while admitting the
Constitution extended to Hawaii, this does not necessitate the
admission that its fifth and sixth amendments were in force
there, since such is not a sound construction of the joint resolu-
tion and are matters of procedure rather than fundamental
rights.
The secondlcase, Territory of Hawaii v. Marshall, upheld
a verdict found by nine out of twelve jurors, convicting Mar-
shall of criminal libel, upon which he was sentenced to six
months at hard labor in the Oahu prison. Judge Estee of the
United States District Court declined to release him on habeas
corpus, because the case was not extreme enough to take the Con-
stitutional question from the Federal Supreme Court on writ of
error to the territorial court, but he remarked obiter that the
Constitution did not apply-held rather strangely, we think,
that the nature of the crime and not its punishment, made it
infamous, or not.
It is submitted that the question involved is simpler and
more specific than the one in Goetz Bros. -v. United States, de-
cided by United States District Judge Townsend against theex-
tension of the Constitution to Porto Rico. By the joint resolu-
tionit is expressly stipulated that the municipal law of Hawaii
not contrary to the Constitution of the United States shall re-
main in force until changed by Congress. The only question
then is, does a prosecution for an infamous crime, without any
indictment by a grand jury and without an unanimous verdict,
contravene the Constitution of the United States? If it does,
then it is clearly rendered void by the joint resolution. So ithas
been uniformly held; asin Bx-parte Wilson, Gray, J., says, "But
the Constitution protecting every one from being prosecuted
without the intervention of a grand jury, for any crime that is
subject by law to an infamous punishment, no declaration of
Congress is needed to secure, or competent to defeat, the Con-
stitutional safeguard." 110 U. S., 422.
In Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S., 349, it was decided that
the territory of Utah could not change the common law
rule; nor could Congress permit it to do so.
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To rebut these, Frear, C. J., seeks to distinguish between
the status of Hawaii before organization and the status of a
territory like Utah after it, and refers to constitutional pro-
visions that apply only to states and not to territories, and
others that obtain in peace but do not apply in war. His argu-
ment is cogently put, but we are forced to repudiate the doc-
trine of status which he applies. It has never been counte-
nanced by judicial decision and has sprung up within 'the last
few years. It is true that some provisions of the Constitution
were meant for states and not for territories, but all decisions
so far have held that the fifth and sixth amendments were lim-
itations upon Congress' power in state and territory alike. It
is true too that war changes legal relations and affects consti.
tutional provisions, andundoubtedly thelaw bends to necessity
and recognizes it. But the justification of effects consequent
upon a state of war, resting solely on the necessity of the
thing, is no logical basis for the doctrine of unorganized states,
in Hawaii at least, where no such necessity exists, with legal
machinery as complete before the enabling act as after it, with
the United States in full control, dejure as well as de facto.
This doctrine that in one status the constitutional provision
applies and in another does not, seems to receive countenance
in a cited case, Talton v. Mayes, 163 U. S. 376 (1895). To
quote from Frear, J., "There the Supreme Court held that the
constitutional provision relating to grand juries did not apply
to the Cherokee nation in the Indian Territory, but that an in-
dictment found by a grand jury of only five persons un-
der the laws of that nation was constitutional." I may inci-
dentally add as bearing upon the other question in this case-
the construction of the joint resolution-that it was expressly
provided in the treaty under which the Cherokees made their
laws that such laws should "not be inconsistent with the Con-
stitution of the United States." But the case itself needs only
to be read to dispel the inference that the same conclusions
should apply to Hawaii. It holds that the fifth amendment is
a limitation upon Congress' power solely, the power of local
legislation in the Cherokee nation not coming from Congress,
but recognized by treaty, is not limited by the fifth amendment
any more than the State of Nebraska is, for as to local govern-
ment it is similar to the states, not the territories. See Ballu
v. Nebraska, 176 U. S., 83. But can we say so much for
Hawaii? Clearly we think not. Once under the complete
dominion of the United States, unlike the Cherokees, the nation
YALE LAW JOURNAL.
ceased, and with it their power of local legislation. After the
transfer and by the terms of the resolution, not the laws of
Hawaii, but the laws of the United States constituted the law
of the land. As far as the old laws were not inconsistent with
the Constitution they became for the time being United States
laws, derivingtheir vigor from the Constitution and necessarily
controlled by its limitations.
In other words, we believe it is past dispute that Congress
cannot pass a law dispensing with a grand jury orsubstituting
a majority verdict for the one required at common law. Fur-
ther, it cannot permit a territory deriving its power of local
legislation from it to pass such a law. Consequently, it seems
logical that it cannot, by failing to act, allow such laws to re-
main in force and thus accomplish indirectly a result which is
prohibited by the Constitution.
For Hawaii these questions are set at rest by the enabling
act, but their importance and the widespread difference of opin-
ion concerning them, make us look forward eagerly to their
final settlement by the Supreme Court, which is promised soon.
